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WARNER BROS. V. NELSON: A PRELUDE TO THE
DE HAVILLAND LAW
John M. Broderick *
In 1944, the California Court of Appeals handed down its landmark
decision in De Haviland v. Warner Bros ending the practice of studios extending personal service contracts beyond the statutory limit of seven years
by adding suspension periods incurred during the contract term. “Suspension/extension” could double the term of an actor’s contract. The De
Haviland case has justly received much attention, but an earlier case, Warner
Bros. v. Nelson, in which Bette Davis also challenged the practice of suspension/extension, merits more attention than it has received.
In Warner Bros. Nelson, Davis argued that her studio contract should
not be enforced on several grounds including that the suspension/extension
clauses were inequitable. During the trial, the studio waived its powerful
rights to suspension/extension for reasons previously unknown. Not until
now has that waiver been properly contextualized with the help of archival
research of studio records. Furthermore, archival research has uncovered
that the studio explored revising and limiting its power of suspension/extension as a result of Davis’s arguments.
This Article reveals that Davis achieved much more than was previously understood. It discusses how these cases, in particular De Haviland,
still resonate today in the sports and entertainment industries. It also suggests that the recent dispute between the Writers Guild of America and the
Association of Talent Agents can be viewed as a consequence of these cases.

*
J.D. 1998 University of Illinois College of Law, M.F.A. 2013 University of Southern California
School of Cinematic Arts. The author wishes to thank Dr. Richard Jewell, Professor Emeritus of
Cinema and Media Studies, University of Southern California School of Cinematic Arts for his
encouragement to seek publication of this article. He would also like to thank his wife Shaunagh
for her support and the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review editorial board and staff
for their assistance and feedback.
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INTRODUCTION

In Hollywood’s classic studio era, 1 stars were held under the thumb of
the major studios with oppressive, long-term personal service contracts. 2
Studios often extended actors’ contractual periods of personal service by
adding the duration of any suspensions incurred by the actors to the original
contract period. 3 In practice, suspension/extension could result in the doubling of an actor’s contractual period of personal service, 4 and could extend
the period far past California’s statutory time limit of seven years. 5 Some
stars rebelled against studio control, including one of Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc.’s (“Warner Bros.”) biggest stars, Academy Award winner Bette Davis. 6
Davis’s clashes with Warner Bros. over being paid less than male actors, artistic autonomy, and the practice of suspension/extension ultimately
led them to a London courtroom in October 1936 in Warner Bros. Pictures,
Incorporated v. Nelson (“Nelson”). 7 Although Davis lost her case, eight
years later in 1944, the Second District of the California Court of Appeal put
an end to the practice of extending personal service contracts beyond the
seven-year statutory limit in De Haviland v. Warner Bros. (“De Haviland”). 8
1. The classic studio era has been defined as the years between 1929 and 1945. See
RICHARD B. JEWELL, THE GOLDEN AGE OF CINEMA 1 (2007); compare with DOUGLAS GOMERY,
THE HOLLYWOOD STUDIO SYSTEM: A HISTORY 71 (2005) (defining classic studio era as the years
between 1931 and 1951).
2. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 255. As a category, personal service contracts “include[]
nearly all master/servant continuous employment agreements.” Jonathan Blaufarb, The Seven-Year
Itch: California Labor Code Section 2855, 6 HASTINGS COMM & ENT L.J. 653, 657 (1983).
3. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 255. Hereinafter, this practice is referred to as “suspension
/extension.” The standard personal service contract used by the studios included suspension/extension clauses. See infra notes 43–44.
4. See infra note 47.
5. In 1931, the statutory time limit for personal service contracts was expanded from five
to seven years. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1980 (West 2020); see Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 657 n.19
(discussing the legislative history of the adoption of a seven-year period).
6. See, e.g., infra notes 150, 183, and 222.
7. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson, [1937] 1 K.B. 209. Davis was married to musician
Harmon O. “Ham” Nelson, Jr. in 1936. See ED SIKOV, DARK VICTORY: THE LIFE OF BETTE DAVIS
90 (2007).
8. De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 985 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944).
The case caption is published in the official case reports with Olivia de Havilland’s name misspelled as “De Haviland.” See Robert Steinberg, Injunctions-Unjust Restraint on Entertainers in
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The resulting decision became known as “the De Havilland Law.” 9 Today,
the De Havilland Law remains relevant in labor relations in the entertainment
industry and sports, and its consequences resonate in the current dispute between the Writers Guild of America and the Association of Talent Agents
member agencies. 10
This Article examines Nelson 11 with the aid of archival research and
demonstrates that, although Davis did not prevail, her case concretely foreshadowed the De Havilland Law. The history of the De Havilland Law is
usually told in the following way: Olivia de Havilland won, whereas Bette
Davis lost. But archival research shows that in spite of Davis’s loss, her case
compelled Warner Bros. to make two unexpected decisions: (1) to waive the
studio’s right to extend Davis’s contract past the seven-year limit in the Nelson case and (2) to examine their standard contracts with an eye toward restricting the practice of suspension/extension. 12
Part II of this Article describes the era in which Nelson and De
Haviland took place, including how the standard studio contract played a
part in the star system in the classic studio era. Part III examines Nelson, 13
in which Warner Bros. filed an injunction against Davis to prevent her from
starring in a film for another production company. Part III also addresses
research from the Warner Bros. archives which shows how Davis’s case
came very close to forcing a change in the standard personal service contract
used by Warner Bros. Part IV discusses the case that Nelson 14

California, 1 LOY. ENT. L.J. 91, 106 n.83 (1981). When referring to Olivia de Havilland herself,
her name will be spelled correctly. When referring to the case caption, her name will be spelled
consistent with the spelling in the official case caption.
9. See, e.g., HOLLYWOOD AND THE LAW 210 (Paul McDonald et al. eds., 2015) (describing
De Haviland v. Warner Bros. as the seminal case that interpreted § 2855 and came to be known as
the “De Havilland Law” in legal parlance); Russell Fowler, Three Women Take on the Hollywood
Studio System, 55 TENN. BAR J. 27, 28 (2019) (referring to de Havilland’s precedent-setting case
as “the De Havilland Law”).
10. See infra Part V.
11. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1 K.B. at 209.
12. See infra Part III Section F.
13. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1 K.B. at 209.
14. Id.
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foreshadowed, De Haviland v. Warner Bros., 15 which ended the practice of
extending personal service contracts past seven years. Part V explores the
significance and relevance of the Nelson and De Haviland cases, and how
the aftershocks from these related cases were felt in postwar Hollywood 16
and continue to be felt today. In the words of Bette Davis’s Margo Channing
in All About Eve, “Fasten your seatbelts, it’s going to be a bumpy night.” 17

II. BACKGROUND
This section contextualizes the legal disputes in Nelson and De Havilland. First, it describes how the classic studio era was organized. Next, it
addresses how the star system worked in the classical studio era. And lastly,
it discusses how the studios used standard long-term personal service contracts with their stars.

A. Corporate Organization of the Classic Studio Era
The classic studio era was ruled by a small set of companies. 18 Eight
studios collected ninety-five percent of film industry revenues: Paramount,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (“MGM”), 19 Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corporation
(“RKO”), Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, Warner Bros., Inc., Columbia Pictures Corporation, Universal Corporation, and United Artists Corporation. 20 These eight studios were known as “the majors.” 21 Through collusion and other monopolistic practices, the majors kept control of the
industry and kept out, for the most part, other potential players. 22 Five of the

1944).

15. De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 985–86 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
16. See DREW CASPER, POSTWAR HOLLYWOOD 1946-1962 1 (2007).
17. ALL ABOUT EVE (Twentieth Century Fox 1950).

18. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 79 (“Eight major corporations . . . dominated all phases
of industry operation.”).
19. MGM was owned by Loew’s, Inc. See id. at 99.
20. See id. at 79.
21. Id. at 1.
22. See id. at 79 (identifying Republic, Monogram, and Disney as small, marginal companies that were tolerated by the majors).
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majors— Paramount, MGM, RKO, Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., and
Warner Bros.— produced, distributed, and exhibited their own motion pictures. 23 These five studios were known as the Big Five. 24 The majors controlled most theaters in the United States and were able to deny outsiders
access to theatrical exhibition in desirable venues. 25

B. The Star System
The star system was a critical component to the success of the film
business during the classic studio era. 26 “Stars” can be defined as “actors
who became intense objects of public fascination.” 27 The star system included the way studios cultivated actors into stars, marketed their stars, and
in turn, marketed their films to exhibitors. 28 The stars cast in a particular
film signaled to both exhibitors and audiences what kind of picture to expect. 29 Studios cast their stars in multiple films each year in different genres,
and audiences could pick the type of film in which to see their favorite actor. 30 Furthermore, instead of being screened to exhibitors beforehand, films
were marketed based on “star power.” 31
Star development represented a significant investment for the studios. 32
This investment included a range of lessons and training such as acting
23. See Brandon Drea, Antitrust Conflict in Hollywood, 9 ARIZ. STATE SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
98, 108 (2020).
24. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 71.
25. See id. at 79.
26. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 250. Even after the U.S. Supreme Court broke up the
majors in U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), stars were an important factor in the
newly formed companies. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 94.
27. JEWELL, supra note 1, at 250.
28. See id. at 251; GOMERY, supra note 1, at 7 (attributing the creation of the business
strategy known as the star system to Adolph Zukor, which was copied by all studios).
29. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 251.
30. See id. at 256–57.
31. Id. at 251.
32. See id. at 258.
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lessons, voice training, grooming advice, and physical fitness coaching. 33 To
protect their investments, the studios kept their actors under long-term employment contracts. 34

C. Use of Long-Term Personal Service Contracts During the
Classic Studio Era
The long-term personal service contract was crucial to the star system. 35 Personal service contracts during this era were usually for five or
seven-year terms, 36 but that limitation only applied to the stars. A studio
bound by such a contract was committed to a given actor for only a six-month
term because these contracts commonly contained a six-month option clause
for the studio to exercise or not. 37 Clearly, the contracts gave studios most
of the power in these relationships. 38 For instance, the studio could determine when vacation periods began and ended, and it had the right to loan its

33. See id.
34. See id. at 255.
35. See id. at 255. Personal service contracts create a “master/servant” relationship. Artists
are not typically classified as servants, but “they will be so defined as long as the promised performance is of a personal and non-delegable character.” “Duties are nondelegable if pertaining to a
contract based on artistic skill or unique abilities.” One reason that an employment contract defines
the services provided by an employee as being “of a special, unique, extraordinary and intellectual
character” is to establish that the services are nondelegable. Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 657.
36. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 255. The term for personal service contracts was limited
by statute to two years until 1919. In 1919, the term was expanded to five years, and in 1931, the
term was expanded to seven years. See Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 656. The expansion to seven
years did not sit well with the acting community: “[n]ew California law allowing seven year contracts is not looked on favorably by talent, who see it only as an advantage to the producer.” Objections to 7-Yr. Contract, VARIETY, June 30, 1931, at 3.
37. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 255; Contract Between Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and
Bette Davis, 15–16 (Dec. 29, 1934) (on file with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).
38. See Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 659 (explaining how entertainment industry contracts
“are written in options, rather for a flat term, in order to allow the employer an advantageous degree
of flexibility in determining the duration of the employment relationship.”). For the star, a longterm contract could offer a degree of security, but this benefit was in tension with the potential
detriment the star may experience when her worth rises dramatically during the contract term,
which was the case with Davis and de Havilland. See id. at 658.
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actors to other studios (called “loan-outs”). 39 In addition, the studio had full
control over the star’s acting assignments. 40
A standard studio contract included several clauses central to the Nelson and De Haviland cases. The first such clause defined the services provided by the star as being “of a special, unique, extraordinary and intellectual
character[] . . . .” 41 The second important clause required the star to render
their services exclusively for the studio. 42 Third, the standard contract gave
the studio the right to suspend the star for a variety of reasons if the star could
not, or refused, to work. 43 Fourth, the contract allowed the studio to extend
the duration of the contract by the length of time of each suspension. 44
The last two clauses—the right to suspend and the right to extend—
embodied the practice of suspension/extension in the standard studio contract. 45 The time an actor was placed on suspension was automatically added
39. A “loan out” occurs when a studio gives another producer or studio the temporary right
to use one of the lending studio’s stars in one of the borrower’s films. See JEWELL, supra note 1,
at 255. The standard personal service contract gave a studio the right to loan out its contract actors
to other studios.
40. But see JEWELL, supra note 1, at 257 (noting that, at times, stars successfully negotiated
for the right to refuse an acting assignment). The way in which an actor broke into the business
could dictate their negotiating posture with the studio. For example, Edward G. Robinson performed in LITTLE CAESAR (Warner Bros. 1931) without a long-term contract, and that film’s success gave him considerable negotiating leverage with the studio. See THOMAS SCHATZ, A
TRIUMPH OF BITCHERY: WARNER BROS., BETTE DAVIS AND JEZEBEL, IN THE STUDIO SYSTEM 77
(Janet Staiger ed., 1995).
41. Contract Between Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and Bette Davis, supra note 37, at
11. The main reason for adding a “unique and extraordinary services” clause is to provide evidence
for a claim of injunctive relief. See infra Section III (C)(1).
42. Contract Between Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and Bette Davis, supra note 37, at 5
(“The Artist agrees that she will, during the term hereof, render such services solely and exclusively
to and for the Producer, and that she will not, during such time, render any service for or in any
other . . . motion picture production . . . .”).
43. See, e.g., id., at 8, 12 (if a star could not perform for medical reasons or did not perform
due to failure, refusal or neglect).
44. See Contract Between Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and Bette Davis, supra note 37, at
12. Suspension/extension clauses demonstrate the studios’ superior bargaining power. See
Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 665 (explaining that suspension/extension benefits the employer by “insuring receipt of the contracted-for period of service at the employee’s current level of compensation”); SCHATZ, supra note 40, at 81 (describing the function of suspension/extension clauses as
preventing stars “from waiting out their contracts and becoming ‘free agents’”).
45. See Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 664.
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to the original duration of the contract, 46 a practice that could double the
length of the contract. 47 Although standard studio contracts were burdensome, stars risked being blacklisted—for example, by other studios refusing
to hire such stars—if they openly challenged the studios, such as by filing a
lawsuit. 48
III. WARNER BROS. V. NELSON
This section examines Nelson and looks behind the scenes at Warner
Bros.’s actions with respect to their standard personal service contract after
the case ended. Section III.A reviews some of the particular issues and
events that led up to Warner Bros. seeking injunctive relief against Bette
Davis. Section III.B analyzes why damages were inadequate in this type of
dispute between a star and her studio. Section III.C examines the nature of
injunctive relief available in California where the contract was made between
the parties, and under English law, the law of the case’s venue. Section III.D
outlines Davis’s legal strategy. Section III.E reviews the outcome of the case
and the court’s decision. Finally, Section III.F demonstrates, with trial records and internal documents, how the practice of suspension/extension came
under scrutiny by the court, and how the Warner Bros. legal team reacted to
that scrutiny.

A. Background of the Dispute Between the Star and the Studio
Bette Davis has been described as “the most unusual of movie stars.” 49
Her stardom was surprising because of her willingness to play unsympathetic

46. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 255.
47. See, e.g., DAVID NIVEN, BRING ON THE EMPTY HORSES 20 (1976) (“Some of us gave
twelve or fourteen sulfurous years of our short actor’s lives working off a seven-year contract”);
VICTORIA AMADOR, OLIVIA DE HAVILLAND LADY TRIUMPHANT 141–42, 146 (1st ed. 2019) (describing how actors were known to have their period of personal service extended up to twelve or
fifteen years because of the practice of suspension/extension).
48. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Olivia de Havilland: The Actress Who Took on the Studio
System and Won, L.A. TIMES, (July 1, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/laoe-stipanowich-de-havilland—20160701-snap-story.html [http://archive.today/8Ojuu]; AMADOR,
supra note 47, at 143 (describing efforts by Warner Bros. to prevent de Havilland from being hired
by other studios and delaying the release of her latest film).
49. JEWELL, supra note 1, at 268; JAMES SPADA, MORE THAN A WOMAN: AN INTIMATE
BIOGRAPHY OF BETTE DAVIS 1036–37 (1993) (Bette Davis was described by Angela Lansbury at
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roles, such as the morally corrupt Mildred in Of Human Bondage 50 and villainesses in other films. 51 She won two Oscars for best actress and at one
time held the record for most nominations at ten. 52
In 1931, Warner Bros. signed Bette Davis to a standard contract for the
first time. 53 Warner Bros. began as a family-owned business in 1923. 54 In
the 1930s, the three brothers: Harry, Abe, and Jack L. Warner led different
parts of the company. 55 Jack Warner, the youngest, was the head of the studio in Burbank, California. 56 While the other major studios made efforts to
remain on good terms with their stars, Warner Bros. earned a reputation for
being the most contentious of studios because of its many conflicts with its
stars. 57
In 1936, a few months before the dispute over her contract erupted,
Davis won her first Oscar for Best Actress for her performance in Dangerous. 58 Because of the recognition she gained from Of Human Bondage and
Davis’s memorial service as a master of the craft “who should serve as an example to future generations of actors”).
50. See generally OF HUMAN BONDAGE (Warner Bros. 1934).
51. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 268.
52. See Academy Awards Database, ACAD. MOTION PICTURES ARTS SCIS., https://
www.oscars.org/oscars/awards-databases-0 [https://perma.cc/BEH8-ERNF].
53. See SIKOV, supra note 7, at 44. Davis agreed to a new contract with Warner Bros. in
1934. Contract Between Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and Bette Davis, supra note 37, at 1. A good
argument can be made that under § 2855, seven years should be counted from the original contract
in 1931 rather than from the contract executed in 1934 because: (1) she likely negotiated her new
agreement as an employee still obligated under an existing contract (and such an employee is not
in a position to negotiate for the highest possible compensation) and (2) she was not able to test her
value in the entire marketplace during an “open-market break” between contracts. See Blaufarb,
supra note 2, at 682 (setting forth the argument that without an “open-market break,” the new
agreement “cannot be viewed as a truly ‘new’ contract” for purposes of § 2855).
54. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 46.
55. See id. at 130. Sam Warner, the fourth brother who co-founded the studio, died in
October of 1927. Id. at 51.
56. Id.
57. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 257; SCHATZ, supra note 40, at 77 (noting that Davis’s
lawsuit was one of many between Warner Bros. and its stars in the 1930’s).
58. DANGEROUS (Warner Bros. 1935); see JEWELL, supra note 1, at 267.
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her recent Academy Award, Davis wanted more substantial roles. 59 During
the summer of 1936, she refused to perform in the film God’s Country and
the Woman and sought to renegotiate her contract with Warner Bros. 60 The
inequality in pay between her and male actors was an additional reason fueling her dispute with the studio. 61 Davis complained to the press in March
1936 about receiving a telegram request for her to return to the studio for
retakes. 62 Davis reportedly complained to the press that her studio bosses
were a “headache,” which did not go unnoticed by those same bosses. 63

59. See, e.g., BETTE DAVIS, THE LONELY LIFE: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 147–48 (2017)
(ebook). Davis’s evolution as a star was a situation the statutory term limit in § 2855 was intended
to address, see De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 988 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1944); see also Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 653 (discussing public policy considerations for limiting
the term of a personal service contract which include “circumstances will change over the course
of the agreement” and an employee’s worth may increase “as a result of increased experience,
talent, and skill”).
60. Letter from Roy J. Obringer to Morris Ebenstein (Aug. 17, 1936) (on file with Warner
Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California). For a detailed account of Davis’s negotiations with Warner Bros., see SCHATZ, supra note 40, at 78–81.
61. See Alma Whitaker, Bette Davis Tells of Battle for Pay, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1936 at
C1. The archive also contains various summaries of the events leading up to the litigation. See,
e.g., Letter from Roy J. Obringer to Robert W. Perkins (Sept. 9, 1936) (on file with the Warner
Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).
62. See Film Bosses ‘Headache’ to Bette Davis, EVENING J., Mar. 25, 1936, at 17 (on file
with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California). The term retake refers to a
“second, third, tenth, or even hundredth attempt to film a given shot; the term retake sometimes
implies that the shooting occurs on a day subsequent to the original takes; actors are often brought
back to the studio at the end of production to shoot retakes of shots and scenes the director finds to
be problematic for one reason or another.” ED SIKOV, FILM STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION 223 (2d
ed. 2020).
63. See Film Bosses ‘Headache’ to Bette Davis, EVENING J., Mar. 25, 1936, at 17 (on file
with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California). The “headache” comment
was precipitated by Davis receiving a telegram from Warner Bros. upon her arrival in New York
for a vacation, which required her to immediately return to Los Angeles for retakes. Id. The term
“retake” refers to a “second, third, tenth, or even hundredth attempt to film a given shot; the term
retake sometimes implies that the shooting occurs on a day subsequent to the original takes; actors
are often brought back to the studio at the end of production to shoot retakes of shots and scenes
the director finds to be problematic for one reason or another.” ED SIKOV, FILM STUDIES: AN
INTRODUCTION 223 (2d ed. 2020) (emphasis in original). See also Telegram from Harry M. Warner
to Hal Wallis (Aug. 10, 1936) (on file with the Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern
California).
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In a letter from one of her attorneys, Dudley R. Furse, Davis set forth
ten terms as a basis for a new contract, 64 which included the following demands: a limit of four pictures per year; three months of vacation time; increased pay; identification of acceptable cameramen; and a contract term of
five years. 65 Jack Warner responded that Warner Bros. would only agree to
an increase in pay if the studio could retain all the other terms from the previous version of the contract. 66
Soon, Warner Bros. learned that Davis was traveling to England with
the intention of appearing in a film for Toeplitz Productions Ltd.
(“Toeplitz”). 67 Roy Obringer, counsel for Warner Bros. in Los Angeles, advised Morris Ebenstein, counsel for Warner Bros. in New York, to have the
studio’s English counsel notify Toeplitz that Davis was still under contract
with Warner Bros. 68 Ebenstein wrote back confirming he did this, and further stated, “I believe this takes care of the situation.” 69 However, the situation was not resolved as Davis still intended to appear in the film for
Toeplitz. 70 Davis arrived in the United Kingdom in mid-August of 1936,
and was warmly welcomed by Ludovico Toeplitz himself in London shortly
thereafter. 71 Warner Bros. thus pursued an injunction against Davis in the
London courts, initiating Warner Bros. v. Nelson. 72

64. See Letter from Dudley R. Furse to Roy J. Obringer (June 19, 1936) (on file with the
Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).
65. Id.
66. See Letter from Jack L. Warner to Bette Davis (June 24, 1936) (on file with the Warner
Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).
67. See Letter from Roy J. Obringer to Morris Ebenstein; supra note 60; see SIKOV, supra
note 7, at 90.
68. See Letter from Roy J. Obringer to Morris Ebenstein; supra note 60.
69. See Letter from Morris Ebenstein to Roy J. Obringer (Aug. 25, 1936) (on file with the
Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).
70. See SIKOV, supra note 7, at 90.
71. See id.
72. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson, [1937] 1 K.B. 209. Davis was served with process in her hotel room. See SIKOV, supra note 7, at 90.
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B. The Inadequacy of Damages
When seeking injunctive relief, as Warner Bros. did in Warner Bros. v.
Nelson, 73 one must show damages are an inadequate remedy. 74 This section
takes a slight detour to examine why damages were inadequate in a situation
where a star like Davis breached her contract. Generally, the non-breaching
party to a contract is compensated with an amount approximate to the benefits the party would have received had the breaching party performed under
the contract. 75 Although many benefits are compensable, they must be
“clearly ascertainable.” 76 For example, lost profits or expenditures, such as
overhead, 77 are often sought as damages. 78
An instructive example of how damages were difficult to calculate
when actors refused assignments can be drawn from the Warner Bros. legal
file for the lawsuit between Warner Bros. and actor Olivia de Havilland that
occurred eight years after Nelson. 79 Olivia de Havilland, who was a friend
of Davis, 80 had great versatility as an actor. 81 She appeared in a variety of
films from a Shakespearean adaptation 82 to horror. 83 De Havilland is most
well-known for her role in Gone With the Wind 84 and the successful pairing
73. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1 K.B. at 209.
74. See, e.g., Elliott Axelrod, The Efficacy of the Negative Injunction in Breach of Entertainment Contracts, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 409, 411 (2013); Steinberg, supra note 8, at 99 n.43.
75. See 1 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 869 (11th ed. 2020).
76. Id. § 879.
77. “Overhead” for a studio included expenses not directly related to production, such as
executives’ salaries, costs of studio real estate, security, insurance, maintenance and other miscellaneous items. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 69.
78. See SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts §§ 879, 883, supra note 75.
79. See infra Section D.
80. See AMADOR, supra note 47, at 50.
81. See id. at 148.
82. See A MIDSUMMER’S NIGHT DREAM (Warner Bros. 1935).
83. See HUSH HUSH SWEET CHARLOTTE (Twentieth Century Fox 1964).
84. GONE WITH THE WIND (Selznick Int’l Pictures in association with Metro-GoldwynMayer 1939); see Justin Chang, Appreciation: Olivia de Havilland Was Never to Be
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of her with Errol Flynn in eight films. 85 De Havilland received five Academy Award nominations and won twice—the same number of wins as Davis. 86
In 1943, de Havilland sought a declaration that her contract had
ended, 87 and, in response, Warner Bros. looked closely at pursuing damages
against her in a counterclaim. 88 She was suspended multiple times and replaced on four films because she refused to perform several roles assigned
by the studio. 89 The studio examined its potential to recover lost profits on
the films she refused to perform in, and whether the studio had incurred increased production costs.
One difficulty with awarding lost profits is the struggle to prove what
“would” have occurred had the contract not been breached. A claimant must
show that the hypothetical profits are not the product of speculation. 90 One
measure of lost profits is past performance. 91 In pursuit of their counterclaim
against de Havilland, Warner Bros. compared the profits of her past films
with the ones she refused. 92 Internal program sheets were compiled listing
Underestimated in Life or Art, L.A. TIMES (July 26, 2020, 6:18 PM), https://www.latimes.com
/entertainment-arts/movies/story/2020-07-26/olivia-de-havilland-appreciation [https://perma.cc
/3HQM-3KUJ].
85. AMADOR, supra note 47, at 38.
86. Id. at 13; see Academy Awards Database, supra note 52.
1944).

87. De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 984 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.

88. See Memorandum from Jack Warner to Roy J. Obringer (July 27, 1944) (on file with
the University of Southern California, University Archives) (“Reference [de Havilland] along the
lines we discussed today. Will you investigate the possibility of our bringing suit against her from
the time she was in default.”); see also Letter from Roy J. Obringer to Charles Loring (Aug. 1,
1944) (on file with the University of Southern California, University Archives) (“[Jack Warner]
desires to be advised with respect to the possibility of seeking damages against Miss [de Havilland]
. . .”) (sic).
89. De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 984.
90. See, e.g., Fallis v. Julian Petroleum Co., 292 P. 168, 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1930).
91. See, e.g., Grupe v. Glick, 160 P.2d 832, 840 (Cal. 1945).
92. See Pictures in Which Olivia DeHaviland Appeared (on file with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California); see also List of Pictures Rejected by Miss DeHavilland (on file with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).
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only her films. 93 The lists showed the films she appeared in for Warner Bros.
and identified her “loan-outs.” 94 Warner Bros. saw a profit on all of her
films. 95 A second program sheet was compiled with the films she refused. 96
Each of the films she refused earned a profit. 97 Based on the program sheets
alone, it would have been difficult to demonstrate to a judge or jury that
Warner Bros. lost profits on the films de Havilland refused.
Warner Bros. also analyzed internally whether de Havilland’s actions
caused an increase in production costs from the cost of replacing her on the
pictures she refused. The archive contains a document entitled “Picture Assignments Rejected by Olivia de Havilland, and comparative cost of replacement artists.” 98 The document identifies the salaries de Havilland would
have been paid on each film and what Warner Bros. paid the replacement
performer. On two films, 99 Warner Bros. paid more for the replacement artist, and paid less on the other two pictures. 100 In total, Warner Bros. would
have paid de Havilland $60,165 for all four films and paid the replacement
artists $57,690. The studio’s own internal analysis demonstrates it would
have been difficult for the studio to recover damages for increased expenditures, since it paid $2,475 less to the replacement artists overall.
Despite the difficulty of attaining actual damages, studios still threatened performers who refused assignments with a claim for damages. For
instance, in a different dispute with Bette Davis in 1934, the studio sent a
letter informing her that she was required to appear at the studio for wardrobe
fittings and other preparations for a picture called Case of the Howling

93. See Pictures in Which Olivia DeHaviland Appeared, supra note 92.
94. See supra note 39 (defining “loan-outs”).
95. See Pictures in Which Olivia DeHaviland Appeared, supra note 92.
96. See List of Pictures Rejected by Miss DeHavilland, supra note 92.
97. See id.
98. Picture Assignments Rejected by Olivia DeHavilland, and Comparative Cost of Replacement Artists (on file with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).
99. See id.
100. See id.
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Dog. 101 The letter stated that since she failed to appear, the studio would
“hold [Davis] responsible for all damages which have accrued or may accrue
to [the studio] as a result of [Davis’s] failure, refusal or neglect to so perform[] . . . .” 102
A lawsuit seeking damages posed difficult problems of proof. The
remedy’s impact as a disciplinary tool was diminished by the potential for a
long period of time to pass before a resolution was reached. Moreover, this
remedy did not protect the studio’s interest as effectively as an injunction,
and further did not work as a method to force stars back to work. 103

C. Injunctive Relief and Personal Service Contracts
Since the remedy of damages was not effective for studios, injunctive
relief was their remedy of choice. Part III.C provides a brief summary of
California law with respect to injunctions and personal service contracts,
which will shed light on why the studio contracts were drafted the way they
were. Part III.C also provides a brief overview of relevant English law to fill
in the legal landscape of the Nelson case.

1. California Law
The California statute which allowed some personal service contracts
to be enforced with injunctive relief was amended between the Nelson and
De Haviland cases, but as discussed below, the substance of the statute was
the same in all relevant respects. Until 1919, section 3423 of the Civil Code
of California prohibited the use of injunctions to prevent a breach of contract. 104 In 1931, the statute was re-codified as section 1980 of the Civil
101. CASE OF THE HOWLING DOG (Warner Bros. 1934). See Letter from Paul A. Chase,
Assistant Sec’y, Warner Bros. to Bette Davis (June 14, 1934) (on file with Warner Bros. Archives
at the University of Southern California).
102. Letter from Paul A. Chase to Bette Davis, supra note 101. At times, studio contracts
provided that the star shall pay for costs and expenses incurred due to the star’s absence unless the
absence was the result of “unavoidable physical disability.” See Contract Between Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc. and Bette Davis, supra note 37, at 9.
103. In Warner Bros. v. Nelson, Warner Bros. specifically argued in the London court that
the difficulty of estimating damages meant that injunctive relief was more appropriate. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson, [1937] 1 K.B. 209, 210.
104. See De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 987 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1944); see also Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 657 n.29 (1983) (discussing evolution of California statutes and personal service contracts from 1872 to 1937).
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Code and amended to allow injunctive relief for the breach of a certain type
of personal service contract as described in the next paragraph. 105 In 1937,
section 1980 of the Civil Code was repealed and section 2855 of the Labor
Code was enacted. 106 The court in De Haviland held section 2855 was a
restatement and continuation of Civil Code section 1980 and not a new enactment. 107 In effect, the court stated that the California statute applicable to
personal service contracts was the same during the time that both Davis and
de Havilland were under contract with Warner Bros. 108
Injunctive relief was permitted only if the personal service contract satisfied two requirements: the contract provided for a service of a “special,
unique, unusual, extraordinary or intellectual character,” and provided a rate
of compensation of a minimum of $6,000 per year. 109 The first requirement
has been called the “unique and extraordinary services rule.” 110 If the services were not unique or extraordinary, damages were the appropriate remedy. 111 The reasoning behind the requirement is that when others can be
found to perform the services, the cost of replacement can be readily calculated. 112 This section of the statute was incorporated in paragraph 22 of Davis’s contract. 113
105. See De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 987 (discussing the history of the California statute); see
also Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 656 (noting that the term for personal service contracts was expanded
from five years to seven years in the 1931 amendment).
106. See De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 986; see also Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 656 (“The statute
was transferred into the Labor Code in 1937 as section 2855 pursuant to the Industrial Labor Relations Act.”).
107. See De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 985.
108. See id. at 986 (discussing the consistency of section 1980 of the Civil Code and section
2855 of the Labor Code).
109. See id. at 985, 987.
110. David Tannenbaum, Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts in the Entertainment
Industry, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 18, 21 (1954).
111. See Steinberg, supra note 8, at 99, n.43.
112. See 13 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 51 (10th ed. 2005).
113. See Contract Between Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and Bette Davis, supra note 37, at
11. See also Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 657 (“The employer includes such provisions in the contract
in order to satisfy the condition precedent to obtaining injunctive relief: that the services be unique
and extraordinary”).
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A second requirement must also be met before an injunction is ordered
to enforce a personal service contract. 114 The contract must provide a minimum amount of compensation. 115 In 1919, this amount was set at the rate of
$6,000 per year. 116 Converted to contemporary dollars, the statutory requirement is equal to approximately $100,000 per year. 117 The dollar amount
suggests the legislature intended this exception to apply to people whose personal services were valued highly.
On the surface, the statute seemed to allow for broad injunctive relief;
however, the courts have held an injunction cannot require the employee to
render personal services or to hire another to perform personal services. 118
Several reasons have been recognized for limiting injunctive relief in the enforcement of personal service contracts: the difficulty in enforcement; the
unsatisfactory character of services rendered when compelled; and, if physical labor is involved, the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude. 119 Rather, the statute has been interpreted to allow an injunction to enforce a negative promise only, such as a promise to render services
exclusively. 120

2. English Law 121
The Davis contract did not contain an explicit choice of law provision.
The court in Nelson 122 applied British law without discussing choice of law
principles. By 1936, both jurisdictions viewed injunctive relief which
114. See De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 987.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See 13 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 48 (10th ed. 2005).
118. See 13 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 52 (10th ed. 2005);
Steinberg, supra note 8, at 91 n.3 (specific performance cannot be used to enforce a party’s obligations to perform under the terms of a personal service contract in California) (citing Poultry Producers of S. Ca., Inc. v. Barlow, 189 Cal. 278, 288, 208 P. 93, 97 (1922)).
119. See SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 48, supra note 117.
120. See SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 52, supra note 118.
121. A nuanced comparison of British and American law is beyond the scope of this article.
122. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson, [1937] 1 K.B. 209.
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enforced a “negative stipulation not to serve any third person within the time
agreed” as an appropriate remedy for the breach of a personal service contract. 123
In 1852, England’s High Court of Chancery issued its landmark 124
opinion in Lumley v. Wagner. 125 Lumley owned an opera house and contracted with the opera singer Johanna Wagner, the niece of composer Richard Wagner, to perform at Lumley’s opera house for three months. 126 The
contract contained a covenant in which Wagner promised not to render her
services for any other theater. 127 Before the contract expired, a rival opera
house offered her more money to sing, and she accepted. 128 Lumley sued,
and the court held that although it could not compel her to sing for Lumley,
it would enforce the covenant not to sing for another. 129
In subsequent cases, English courts enjoined performers who would not
be considered stars in their fields. 130 As one legal commentator put it, “the
English courts are not impressed by this ‘unique and extraordinary services’
rule.” 131 In Grimston v. Cuningham, the court issued an injunction against
an understudy. 132 In Lanner v. Palace Theatre Ltd., 133 the court rejected the
123. See, e.g., Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328, 336 (1897) (citing Lumley v. Wagner,
42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852)).
124. See Axelrod, supra note 75 at 410; Tannenbaum, supra note 110, at 18 (“the single,
well-accepted principle that, under appropriate circumstances, equity will enjoin the breach of a
covenant in an artiste’s contract not to perform for others, can be traced back directly to the landmark case of Lumley v. Wagner[]”).
125. Lumley v. Wagner (1852), 42 Eng. Rep. 687.
126. Id. at 605.
127. Id. at 606.
128. Id. at 606–07.
129. Id. at 619.
130. American courts have enjoined a variety of performers and athletes from providing
their services to third parties before their contracts expired. See Tannenbaum, supra note 110, at
21–22.
131. Id. at 22.
132. Grimston v. Cunningham, [1894] 1 Q.B. 125 (Eng.).
133. Lanner v. Palace Theatre Ltd., [1893] 9 T.L.R. 162, 165 (Eng.).
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argument that a distinction should be made based on the “eminence” of a
performer before issuing an injunction. 134 The plaintiff, a renowned ballet
instructor, entered into six-year contracts with her students in which she
promised to train them and took a percentage of their wages for work she
found them. 135 The students agreed in the contracts not to perform for anyone else. 136 Two of her students signed contracts to perform at the Palace
Theater, and Lanner sued to enjoin them from performing. 137 One of the
student’s attorneys argued that the court should not follow Lumley, because
Lumley involved a performer who “had some special qualifications which
could not be dispensed with or replaced—e.g., those of a prima donna . . . .
” 138 The court rejected this argument explaining “[t]o distinguish between
degrees of excellence and to determine who was an indispensable performer
or who was not would be a very difficult task for the Court.” 139 These decisions show that English courts considered the personal service provided by
most artists and performers to be sufficiently unique and specialized in order
to be enjoined. 140
If English courts enjoined an understudy and a ballet student, certainly
Bette Davis would be enjoined. Notably, in the case of Gaumont British
Corporation Ltd. v. Alexander, 141 which was decided in the same year as
Davis’s case and also involved a film actor and film studio, the court ruled
that the contract which required the actor to provide her services exclusively
to the studio during the term of the contract was not an unlawful restraint of
trade. 142 Furthermore, establishing that Bette Davis’s services were unique
and extraordinary would not be difficult. Her contract, like similar studio
contracts, provided that the parties agreed “the services to be rendered by the
134. Id. at 163.
135. Id. at 162.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 163.
139. Id.
140. See Tannenbaum, supra note 110, at 22.
141. Gaumont Corp. v. Alexander [1936] 2 All E.R. 1686 (Eng.).
142. See id. (affirming arbitrator’s decision).

BRODERICK_MACROS_V4.5 (DO NOT DELETE)

130

3/2/2021 11:25 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:2

Artist . . . are of a special, unique, extraordinary and intellectual character[]
. . . .” 143

D. Davis’s Strategy
Davis and her legal team probably knew an English court would enforce the contract. 144 They gambled that they could show the contract was
so unfair it should not be enforced at all. 145 The Times Law Report summarized Davis’s claims as follows: Warner Bros. “required [Davis] to play unsuitable parts, and had frequently required her to work for excessive periods
in the day, such periods constantly exceeding 14 hours; and that [Warner
Bros.] had further required [Davis] to make an unreasonably large number
of films in 1935.” 146 It was reported to counsel for Warner Bros. that Davis
claimed she was required to work more than forty weeks that year in violation of her contract. 147
Sir Patrick Hastings, counsel for Warner Bros., responded by characterizing Davis’s claims as “the actions of a very naughty young lady.” 148 In
response to Davis’s counsel’s characterization of her contractual obligations
as “slavery,” Sir Patrick focused on the graduating salary scale outline in her

11.

143. See Contract Between Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and Bette Davis, supra note 37, at

144. According to Sikov and his review of The Bette Davis Collection, Ludovico Toeplitz,
in fact, told Davis as early as August of 1936, that he was advised by his counsel that her contract
with Warner Bros. was valid; she could not legally contract with Toeplitz; Warner Bros. would be
successful in obtaining an injunction; and that he was recasting her part. SIKOV, supra note 7, at
94.
145. The year 1936 was a busy year for the Warner Bros. legal department. In addition to
Davis’s case, the studio defended separate lawsuits filed by actors James Cagney and Ann Dvorak.
See discussion infra note 178. James Cagney successfully claimed that his contract with Warner
Bros. should be terminated after the studio materially breached it, thus entitling him to an annulment of the contract. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 88–89, Cagney v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc. (Apr. 2, 1936) (on file with the Warner Bros. Archives at the University of
Southern California). The Los Angeles Times declared with a touch of hyperbole that the Cagney
case made “iron-bound contracts . . . things of the past.” Edwin Schallert, Cagney’s Victory Opens
Door for Stars’ Walkouts, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1936, at C1.
146. Law Report, Oct. 14, THE TIMES, Oct. 15, 1936, at 4.
147. Telegram from Manuel Espinosa to Roy J. Obringer (Sept. 24, 1936) (on file with the
Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).
148. SIKOV, supra note 7, at 92.
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contract, and said “[i]f anybody wants to put me into perpetual servitude on
that basis of remuneration, I shall prepare to consider it.” 149 Davis entertained homicidal thoughts against Sir Patrick, 150 and took to staring at the
judge, Mr. Justice Sir George Branson, in an effort to hypnotize him 151 with
her “Bette Davis Eyes.” 152
E. The Outcome of Warner Bros. v. Nelson
Despite the best efforts of Davis’s counsel, Sir William Jowitt, she did
not prevail. 153 Davis did not testify, and the court held it against her. 154 The
court stated in its opinion that she had “broken her positive undertakings in
the contract without any cause or excuse which she was prepared to support
in the witness-box.” 155 Elsewhere, the court held Davis “for no discoverable
reason except that she wanted more money, declined to be further bound by
the agreement, left the United States and, in September, entered into an
agreement in [England] with a third person.” 156
The court issued an injunction in favor of Warner Bros., barring Davis
from appearing on stage or in motion picture productions for any studios
other than Warner Bros. without the studio’s consent for three years, or for
the remaining term on her contract, whichever was less. 157 The court relied
on the contract’s exclusivity provision and legal precedent such as Lumley. 158
149. Id.
150. DAVIS, supra note 59, at 153.
151. Id. at 155.
152. KIM CARNES, Bette Davis Eyes, on MISTAKEN IDENTITY (EMI America 1981);
SIKOV, supra note 7, at 414 (the song “celebrated the mysterious allure of [Davis’s] most notable
features”).
153. DAVIS, supra note 59, at 155 (according to Davis, “[Sir William] made a beautiful and
impassioned plea for [her] rights.”).
154. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson, [1937] 1 K.B. 209.
155. Id. at 215–16.
156. Id. at 213.
157. Id. at 222.
158. Lumley v. Wagner (1852), 42 Eng. Rep. 687–88.
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The court recognized that the interest of Warner Bros. in need of protecting
was “vague,” but held that the studio’s films with Davis that were completed,
yet unreleased, would depreciate in value if she appeared in films released
by others. 159 The court held the three-year injunction served that purpose. 160
The outcome was an utter defeat for Davis and other stars bound by similar
contracts, except in one respect. 161

F. Suspension/Extension Under Scrutiny
During the Nelson trial, clause 23 of Davis’s contract, which allowed
the studio to add suspension time to the duration of the contract, came under
scrutiny. 162 On day two of the trial, Sir William zeroed in on clause 23. He
posed a hypothetical to the court:
SIR WILLIAM JOWITT: Let me assume that this lady . . . decides: I will not work for anybody else; it is a very long time to
wait, but I will wait until 1942, and then at last by 1942 I shall be
free to exercise my art once more. Not at all. She will not have
utilized or eaten up any of the time [of the contract term], because
the period, let alone the extended periods, will never have come
to an end . . . unless and until this lady carries out her contractual
obligation, the period of time during which this bar is to last never
comes to an end . . . It is a life sentence, therefore. 163
After further discussion, Sir William quoted from a letter sent to Davis from
Warner Bros., dated June 20, 1936. 164 The letter was a typical example of
the written notice issued by Warner Bros. to inform an artist that she was

159. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1 K.B. at 221–22.
160. Id. at 222.
161. Actor and friend George Arliss persuaded Davis not to appeal. See DAVIS, supra note
59, at 158–59.
12–13.

162. See Contract Between Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and Bette Davis, supra note 37, at

163. Transcript of Hearing at 24, Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson (1936) (on file with
Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).
164. Id. at 25.
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placed on suspension. 165 The letter incorporated clause 23 and stated the
studio had the right to add the period of suspension to the term of the contract. 166 From a trial strategy point of view, reading the letter in court showed
that the contractual language truly governed the parties’ relationship, and
that clause 23 accurately demonstrated the actual business practice of the
studio.
Justice Branson clarified for himself that the studio had the discretion
to extend the term of the contract until Davis returned to work.
MR. JUSTICE BRANSON: If your case is correct, the effect of
the exercise of the option to extend in the letter of the 20th June is
to keep open the period, which would otherwise end on the 2nd
January, until she shall have consented to go back to them.
SIR WILLIAM JOWITT: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE BRANSON: And that would last indefinitely.
SIR WILLIAM JOWITT: It lasts indefinitely . . . . 167
This part of the hearing must have set off alarms in Warner Bros.’s legal
camp. Although Justice Branson never stated that clause 23 was invalid, or
that it would prevent him from issuing an injunction, his demeanor must have
spoken volumes to Warner Bros.’s counsel. The first item of business on
day three of the hearing was Warner Bros.’s counsel waiving the studio’s
rights under clause 23.
SIR PATRICK HASTINGS: We are proposing to suggest to your
Lordship that, for the purpose of the injunction and no other purpose, we should voluntarily forego as from to-day any rights under Clause 23, which is the suspension clause. 168

165. Id. at 26.
166. Id. at 24–25.
167. Id. at 26.
168. See Letter from Robert W. Perkins to Freston & Files (Nov. 11, 1936) (on file with
Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).

BRODERICK_MACROS_V4.5 (DO NOT DELETE)

134

3/2/2021 11:25 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:2

Since the waiver was buried in the middle of a longer speech, the court
requested clarification.
MR. JUSTICE BRANSON: I do not quite follow that. You are
saying that, if this is carried out, you voluntarily forego as from
to-day the right to extend the existing period?
SIR PATRICK HASTINGS: We forego the suspension clause;
therefore, the contract will come to an end. 169
The waiver admits implicitly that the contract could last indefinitely and that
this was problematic under the law. After the court issued the injunction,
counsel for Warner Bros. explained that the waiver was essential to victory. 170 In a letter dated on October 20, 1936 to Robert W. Perkins, General
Counsel for Warner Bros., English counsel advised that “[t]he Suspension
Clause contained in [Clause] 23 proved the most troublesome clause . . .
[and] accordingly instructed Counsel to waive [Warner Bros.’s] rights under
the Suspension Clause . . . .” 171
The Times Law Report dutifully reported the waiver, 172 but the legal
maneuver did not seem to find its way into the American press, much less its
significance. 173 In 1954, a member of the Los Angeles Bar discussed the
waiver in a published law journal article about enforcement of personal service contracts. 174 Without the benefit of primary sources, such as hearing
transcripts or studio records, the author admittedly could only guess at the
significance of the waiver, and speculated that it “apparently” was intended
to signal to the court that the studio “was ready, willing and able to perform
its part of the contract[.]” 175
169. Id.
170. See Letter from Denton, Hall & Burgin to Robert W. Perkins (Oct. 20, 1936) (on file
with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).
171. Id.
172. Law Report, Oct. 16, THE TIMES, Oct. 17, 1936, at 4.
173. See, e.g., Bette Davis Barred From British Film, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1936, at 31;
Court Curbs Bette Davis, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1936, at 2.
174. Tannenbaum, supra note 110, at 18–19.
175. Id. at 24–25. A scholarly film essay originally published in 1988 discussed how
Warner Bros.’s English counsel found the suspension/extension clauses problematic, but the essay
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Was the waiver significant? The case was set in a foreign court, and
since it does not appear that the American press reported on the waiver, it is
not clear when American lawyers would learn about the waiver and the reasons behind it. 176 English courts were more interested in weighing equities
of an individual case rather than establishing consistent precedent as compared to U.S. courts. 177 In any event, an English trial court decision had zero
precedential value in the U.S. And yet, Warner Bros. and its counsel must
have thought the waiver was significant. 178 The Warner Bros. archives at the
University of Southern California contain a number of correspondences between Warner Bros. legal department and their London counsel showing that
not only did outside counsel advise Warner Bros. that Clause 23 violated
public policy to such a degree that counsel did not want to defend it in
court—eight years before the landmark De Haviland case—but Warner
Bros.’s general counsel also considered changing the contract, the cudgel of
the star system, altogether.
After reviewing the court’s opinion and English counsel’s October 20
letter, 179 Perkins wrote to Warner Bros.’s outside counsel in Los Angeles,
Freston & Files, stating, “this litigation affords a good many hints . . . as to
possible revisions of our form of contract.” 180 He further agreed that the

did not discuss the in-court waiver, Sir William Jowitt’s arguments to the court about the suspension/extension clauses, nor that Warner Bros. considered rewriting its standard personal service
contract to limit the practice of suspension/extension. See SCHATZ, supra note 40, at 81.
176. See Law Report, Oct. 16, supra note 172.
177. Steinberg, supra note 8, at 110.
178. Warner Bros. received some validation in the summer of 1936. See Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law at 1, 11–12, Fenton v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. (Cal. Super. Ct., July 1,
1936) (No. 396484) (on file with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).
The case was filed by actress Ann Dvorak under her married name of Fenton. She alleged Warner
Bros. breached its contract by placing her on medical suspension, even though she claimed she was
sufficiently healthy and able to work, thus entitling her to a termination of contract remedy. On
July 1, 1936, the court ruled against Dvorak in a decision she chose not to appeal, holding that the
studio had the right to place her on suspension pursuant to the contract since Warner Bros. had
acted in good faith and based its decision on medical advice. The court decided that the studio
could extend her contract by the length of time she was on suspension.
179. See Letter from Denton, Hall, & Burgin to Robert W. Perkins, supra note 170.
180. Letter from Robert W. Perkins to Freston & Files, Law Office (Oct. 29, 1936) (on file
with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).
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court’s concern about binding Davis too long to the contract “impelled the
court to limit the effect of his injunction to the period of three years.” 181
However, Perkins’s letter indicates that he did not believe that the studio’s right to extend the term of the contract should be capped. On the contrary, he characterized the issue as the court not understanding California
law, and that California law allowed for a longer injunction. 182 He proposed
revising the contract with a reference or quote from California law, which
provided that personal service contracts could have a term of seven years. 183
If the contract referred to California law, and showed both parties were aware
of California law, the court may have felt more comfortable issuing a sevenyear injunction. 184
Subsequently, the studio’s English lawyers made their own recommendation, and advised that Clause 23 should be revised. “[I]t will, when this
case is completed, be desirable to consider the provisions of the Bette Davis
type of Contract in the light of the Court’s observations . . . It seems to us
that the chief point for consideration will be the Suspension Clause, Clause
23.” 185 Counsel characterized the clause as “unnecessarily wide for the protection of a Producing Company,” and recommended substantially limiting
the amount of time a contract term could be extended based on suspension
periods. 186 Counsel wrote:
We think that the period of prolongation when suspension is exercised might be limited either to a definite number of weeks, as
for example six weeks, or to such a period as would be required
to enable the Producer to complete the film actually in making
when the Star walks out[] . . . . 187

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. Perkins was probably referring to section 1980 of the Civil Code, which was repealed and replaced with section 2855 of the Labor Code in 1937.
184. Id.
185. Letter from Denton, Hall & Burgin, to Robert W. Perkins (Oct. 22, 1936) (on file with
Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).
186. Id.
187. Id. (emphasis added).
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Perkins’s next correspondence to Freston & Files revealed he felt conflicted
about limiting the studio’s right to extend the contract. 188 At first, he instructed Freston & Files that the recommended limitation “should be seriously considered.” 189 However, the letter further sets forth reasons why the
studio needed the suspension/extension clauses in their present form. 190 For
instance, Perkins was open to a limited suspension period at the beginning
of the contract, but if the artist breached in his last year, “the artist might
very well wait the contract out.” 191 If the breach occurred earlier in the contract, the artist still might wait out the current term of the contract until the
studio renewed its option, and then return at a higher salary. 192
Next, Perkins set forth his interpretation of California law, which
would be tested in the De Haviland case. This section also seems tinged
with conflict: “I still cling to the thought that the California law by statute
validates personal service contracts of this nature . . . .” 193 In his view, the
seven-year limit on personal service contracts included “[t]he time the contract has to run, plus the period of suspension, plus the period then or thereafter to run, including all options exercised[] . . . .” 194 What Perkins wrote
next reveals his struggle to reconcile his interpretation of California law and
how that interpretation conflicts with California law: “An indefinite suspension, however, even if limited by the seven-year aggregate, might be undesirable[] . . . .” 195
How could a seven-year contract result in an indefinite suspension? At
first glance, Perkins seems to accept that the statutory limit starts from the
date the contract is signed and ends seven calendar-years later. But in fact,
he interpreted the statute to mean seven years of actual work—no matter how

188. See Letter from Robert W. Perkins to Freston & Files (Nov. 6, 1936) (on file with
Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).
189. Perkins further writes that Jack Warner “was willing to write the clause that way.” Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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long it took for the employee to accumulate those seven years. 196 This is the
interpretation he “clung” to in the face of a strong opposing view—a view
he turned to again at the end of the discussion: “it might be better to limit the
suspension to six or twelve months.” 197
In what appears to be the last correspondence in the file from Perkins
regarding the Nelson litigation, revising Clause 23 is not mentioned. 198 The
tone of the letter is considerably different. The clause’s importance is reaffirmed: “[t]he waiver might have been a high price to pay but I believe that
we got value received.” 199 The letter’s main subject is the effect of the
waiver on the duration of the present term of the contract, and the timing of
the studio’s exercise of the next option. 200 As far as the issue of validity was
concerned, Perkins put the matter to rest:
There was nothing in the litigation in England which indicated
that it was not valid. I know of nothing in any American case
which would indicate that it was not valid. The only question
raised about it was whether if it were permitted to run indefinitely
a court of equity would grant an injunction, and that is a question
of remedy and not of validity. 201
The last sentence seems to run counter to the relationship between rights and
remedies. Entitlement to a remedy is inextricably connected to one’s rights,
and here, the studio’s rights were sourced in the validity of its contract. Although more internal discussion may have taken place about Clause 23, the
studio continued to place actors on suspensions and extend the duration of
their contracts, as evidenced by de Havilland’s case. 202

196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Perkins’ interpretation of the hearing transcripts of the “English litigation” does not
align with local counsel’s view of the court’s attitude toward Clause 23. Id.
1944).

202. See De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 984 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
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IV. A CASE FORESHADOWED: DE HAVILAND V. WARNER BROS.
The trouble Warner Bros. faced in Nelson over Clause 23 was the
forerunner of their next legal hurdle in De Haviland v. Warner Bros. eight
years later. 203 Suspension/extension came under scrutiny again and the scrutiny could not be avoided this time. 204 De Havilland’s lawsuit was a direct
challenge to the studio’s interpretation and application of the suspension
clause. 205
In 1943, de Havilland, like Davis in 1936, was discontent with her situation at Warner Bros.; the studio was not assigning her the challenging roles
she craved, and was paying her a fraction of what it paid her frequent male
co-star Errol Flynn. 206 She had become a major star because of Gone with
the Wind. 207 When the seven-year term of her contract ended in mid-1943,
de Havilland learned it was in fact not over because the studio was tacking
on six months on for suspensions she incurred during her contract term. 208
De Havilland’s attorney, Martin Gang, made it clear in the pleading he
filed on her behalf and in his other communications with the studio that the
actor was taking direct aim at suspension/extension. 209 Gang filed an action
203. Id. at 985.
204. See infra notes 206–13 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 206–13 and accompanying text.
206. See Stipanowich, supra note 48. Warner Bros. exercised all six options in its contract
with de Havilland from 1936 to 1943. De Havilland was a minor when she first contracted with
Warner Bros., and because of her minor status, the contract was “reviewed and approved by the
Los Angeles Superior Court . . . as ‘just, fair and conscionable.’” Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 666–
68.
207. GOMERY, supra note 1, at 306.
208. See Stipanowich, supra note 48.
209. Memorandum from Roy J. Obringer to Jack Warner (Aug. 19, 1943) (on file with
Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California) (summarizing a telephone call
from Martin Gang in which he asked “whether we were aware that our 7 years on OLIVIA
DEHAVILLAND expired in May”) (emphasis in original); see also Memorandum from Roy J.
Obringer to Jack Warner (Aug. 24, 1936) (on file with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of
Southern California) (summarizing the complaint filed by Gang on de Havilland’s behalf as
“merely reciting” when the contract started and that “the 7 years ran out”); see also AMADOR, supra
note 47, at 142 (relating a pre-filing conversation between de Havilland and Gang in which Gang
expressed his opinion that seven years “meant seven calendar years, with no provision for additional time due to suspensions”).
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for declaratory judgment seeking to declare de Havilland’s contract had
ended because it had run for seven years from the date of execution. 210 Once
Jack Warner learned this was the issue being raised by de Havilland, he recognized that it was significant, perhaps recalling the issue having been raised
in connection with the Nelson case. 211
De Havilland prevailed in the lower court and Warner Bros. appealed. 212 The central issue was whether the legislature intended the sevenyear limitation on the length of personal service contracts to be calculated in
terms of calendar years or the time of actual service. 213 To justify the practice of suspension/extension, Warner Bros. trotted out its interpretation of
the law that seven years meant seven years of actual work. 214 After the court
outlined the history of section 2855 of the Labor Code, 215 the court rejected
Warner Bros.’s argument and interpreted the statute to mean seven calendar
years. 216 The court identified public policy reasons for the statutory time
limit imposed on personal service contracts such as an employee’s freedom
to change his employer or occupation, and, as an employee grows “more
experienced and skillful there should be a reasonable opportunity to move
upward . . . .” 217 The De Haviland decision brought an end to a powerful

1944).

210. See De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 985 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.

211. Memorandum from Jack Warner to Ralph Lewis (Aug. 20, 1943) (on file with Warner
Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California) (Warner writes that the “Olivia De Havilland situation is a very serious matter”).
212. See generally De Haviland, 153 P.2d 983.
213. De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 986, 987–88 (declaring that since the statute created rights
to promote the welfare of the general public, time limits cannot be waived by an artist).
214. Id. at 985; see also Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 666 n.75 (1983) (describing Warner
Bros.’s position as “an extensive semantic argument”).
215. De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 985.
216. Id. at 986. “It cannot be questioned that the limitation of time to which section 1980
related from 1872 to 1931 was one to be measured in calendar years.”
217. Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 667. Id. at 653, 654, 681 (arguing that section 2855 provides
an “open-market break” for the employee, which is “the interval following the termination of a
contractual commitment when an employee is free to negotiate for his services on the open market”). One year after the De Haviland decision, the Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in
a case involving a star placed on suspension by his studio for refusing a role. When actor Robert
Cummings reported for work at the end of his suspension and attempted to collect his first postsuspension paycheck, the studio refused to pay him. Cummings filed suit to declare the contract
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tool used by the studios to manage labor, and ended a practice that subverted
the public policy of the state of California. 218
V. ENDURING IMPACT OF NELSON AND DE HAVILAND
Bette Davis was one of three major female stars who challenged the
studio system in a significant way. 219 Davis described herself as a “pioneer
in trying to break the studio system’s hold on actors.” 220 Her struggle was
an early instance of a fight for equal pay in Hollywood—a fight that is still
being waged today. 221
A significant part of her dispute with Warner Bros. before she left for
England was the inequality in pay between her and male actors. 222 It was
not simply a matter of her opinion or subjective perception; Warner Bros.
did pay men more than women, even when a man and woman starred in the

terminated based on the studio’s breach. In affirming the lower court, the Ninth Circuit specifically
addressed the studio’s defense that it had the right to keep Cummings on suspension indefinitely:
“A continued suspension and refusal to pay appellee’s compensation, coupled with a continuous
extension of the contract for like periods and a prohibition with the contract against [Cummings’s]
right to offer his services to any other employer could deny to [Cummings] forever the right to
work at his profession and earn a livelihood.” The court’s opinion does not reference the De
Haviland case nor § 2855. Universal Pictures Co. v. Cummings, 150 F.2d 986, 987–88 (9th Cir.
1945); see De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 988.
218. Warner Bros. petitioned the California Supreme Court but was denied a hearing. See
Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 668–69 and accompanying notes.
219. See Fowler, supra note 8, at 27–28 (naming the three women as Davis, de Havilland,
and Mary Pickford).
220. CHARLOTTE CHANDLER, THE GIRL WHO WALKED HOME 110 (2006). Directly confronting the majors over suspension/extension was a major risk for actors. See Stipanowich, supra
note 48. Jack Warner tried to stop other studios from hiring de Havilland after she prevailed in
court. See AMADOR, supra note 47, at 143; HOLLYWOOD AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 216.
221. See, e.g., Ashley Lee, Jennifer Lawrence Pens Essay: “Why Do I Make Less Than My
Male Co-Stars?”, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Oct. 13, 2015, 7:06 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/jennifer-lawrence-pens-essay-why-831635
[https://perma.cc/FB5HBHW5]; Dave McNary, SAG-AFTRA Exploring Pay Disparity on “All the Money in the World”
ReShoots, VARIETY (Jan. 10, 2018, 5:54 PM), https://variety.com/2018/film/news/sag-aftra-paydisparity-all-the-money-in-the-world-re-shoots-1202660831/ [https://perma.cc/V56K-JPMD].
222. See Whitaker, supra note 61, at C1.
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same movie and were given equal billing. 223 Not only did Warner Bros. pay
male stars more than Davis, but male supporting actors and character actors
could be paid double what Davis made. 224
To some extent, this Article corrects the record in a small but meaningful way about Davis’s struggle for equal treatment and artistic freedom. Her
case is viewed, not incorrectly, as a valiant loss on an issue on which de
Havilland later won. 225 One notable distinction between the two cases is that
de Havilland filed her lawsuit after she had completed the original sevenyear term on her contract, whereas Davis still had time left on her 1934 contract when Warner Bros. sued her for an injunction in 1936. 226
But Davis and her legal team deserve more credit than for simply trying. Only with archival research can the studio’s waiver be properly contextualized. 227 A connection does not appear to have been made previously between the waiver, Davis’s counsel’s arguments to the court, and Warner
Bros.’s British counsel’s concerns about suspension/extension. 228 The arguments in Nelson, and the behind-the-scenes reaction to the arguments by the
Warner Bros. legal team, concretely foreshadowed the De Haviland case
years in advance. 229 The De Havilland Law itself has been utilized up to the
223. GOMERY, supra note 1, at 133 (“Men were better paid than women, even in films
where women got equal billing”); see also SCHATZ, supra note 40, at 77 (describing how Davis
lagged behind her male colleagues in terms of salary and status at Warner Bros.).
224. SIKOV, supra note 7, at 106. Davis was paid 2.5 times less than supporting actor Guy
Kibbee.
225. See, e.g., AMADOR, supra note 47, at 13 (“[De Havilland] broke Hollywood’s contract
system by winning her landmark lawsuit against tenacious Jack Warner when Bette Davis
couldn’t”); Matthew Belloni, De Havilland Lawsuit Resonates Through Hollywood, REUTERS
(Aug. 23, 2007, 7:13 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/industry-lawsuit-dc/de-havilland-lawsuit-resonates-through-hollywood-idUSN2329585820070824
[https://perma.cc/LZJ5-VLWU]
(“Bette Davis lost a similar case in the 1930s”); TONY THOMAS, THE FILMS OF OLIVIA DE
HAVILLAND 37 (1st ed. 1983) (Davis “mounted an unsuccessful lawsuit” challenging suspension
and extension).
226. See HOLLYWOOD AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 216.
227. See supra Part III Section F.
228. See supra Part III Section F.
229. See SCHATZ, supra note 40, at 81 n.22 (observing that Warner Bros.’s British counsel’s reservations about suspension/extension mirrored those of the court in the De Haviland case);
DAVIS, supra note 59, at 160 (“the publicity attendant to my litigation paved the way for Olivia de
Havilland’s eventual court victory over the immoral suspension clause.”).
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present-day by recording artists, 230 boxers 231 and even talent agents 232 to cancel long-term contracts. Questions remain about how the rule will be applied
in the context of Major League Baseball, 233 “360 deals” in the music industry, 234 and in the arena of mixed martial arts. 235 Today, section 2855 is often
used as a tool for contract negotiation. 236
Finally, Davis and de Havilland’s struggle to liberate artists from the
oppressive use of long-term contracts resonates today in yet another way. A
connection can be traced from the De Haviland case to the present-day labor
dispute between the Writers Guild of America (“WGA”) 237 and the talent

230. When recording artists seek to cancel their contracts under § 2855, they are presented
with unique issues under § 2855(b). See, e.g., Kathryn Rosenberg, Restoring the Seven Year Rule
in the Music Industry, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 275, 294–95 (2015) (discussing the band 30STM’s efforts to cancel its contract with EMI); Gregg B. Ramer, Personal
Service With a Smile: A History of California’s “Seven-Year” Rule, KATTENMUCHINROSENMAN
LLP, https://katten.com/files/48984_Spotlight_on_Entertainment_and_Media%20Law_Personal
_Service_With_a%20Smile_A_History_of_Californias_Seven_Year_Rule.pdf [http://perma.cc
/SLZ5-LZT5] (“Section 2855(b)(3) creates a unique challenge with respect to the enforceability of
music industry contracts.”).
231. See De La Hoya v. Top Rank, Inc., No. 00-cv-9230-WMB, WL 34624886, at *12
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2001).
232. Belloni, supra note 225 (reporting that Agent Ed Limato used § 2855 to terminate his
contract with ICM in order to join WME).
233. See Mitchell Nathanson, More Than Just California Dreamin’?: California Labor
Code §2855 and Its Applicability to Major League Baseball, 17 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 23, 24
(2017).
234. See Patricia Tsai, Discovering the Full Potential of the 360 Deal: An Analysis of the
Korean Pop Industry, Seven-Year Statute, and Talent Agencies Act of California, 20 UCLA ENT.
L. REV. 324, 342 (2013).
235. See Jeffrey B. Same, Breaking the Chokehold: An Analysis of Potential Defenses
Against Coercive Contracts in Mixed Martial Arts, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1057, 1077–78 (2012).
236. See, e.g., Ramer, supra note 230 (describing how the cast of the television series Modern Family invoked the statute in the middle of contract negotiations).
237. See Agency Campaign Timeline (updated August 2020), WRITERS GUILD OF
AMERICAN WEST, https://www.wga.org/members/membership-information/agency-agreement
/wga-agency-campaign-timeline. See also Drea, supra note 23, at 121 (“The Writers Guild is the
labor union that is the exclusive collective bargaining representative for writers in the entertainment
industry.”).
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agencies which represent WGA members. 238 The through line begins with
the changes that occurred in the wake of the De Haviland decision. After
stars were freed from long-term contracts and the practice of suspension/extension, they gained new artistic freedoms, and greater creative freedom increased their power and independence. 239
Another development occurred a few years after the De Haviland decision which involved neither Davis nor de Havilland, but nonetheless plays
a significant part in the chain of events explored here. In 1948, the U.S.
Supreme Court in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 240 ended the
monopoly over the film industry held by the majors. 241 As a result, the Big
Five were forced to sell their theaters, 242 and all of the majors had to end a
host of monopolistic practices. 243
Thus, the De Haviland 244 decision and the outcome of United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc. 245 operated as a one-two punch against the studio

238. See Agency Campaign Timeline, supra note 237. Four major talent agencies represented over sixty-five percent of the WGA members who had agents before the present dispute
began.
239. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 206; CASPER, supra note 16 at 47.
240. United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 181 (1948); see also Drea,
supra, note 23, at 110–12 (discussing history of the anti-trust litigation as it progressed from the
trial court level to the U.S. Supreme Court and back to the trial court on remand).
241. Before the trial court could implement the Supreme Court’s order to consider ordering
the majors to divest their theater chains, two of the majors, RKO and Paramount, voluntarily signed
a consent decree. The final decision for the six remaining majors was filed in July 1949. Drea,
supra, note 23, at 101, 111 (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881
(S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff’d, 339 U.S. 974 (1950)).
242. GOMERY, supra note 1, at 94.
243. Drea, supra note 23, at 112.
1944).

244. De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 984 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
245. United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 138 (1948).
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system. 246 The majors lost much of their negotiating power, 247 and actors,
writers, and directors flocked to talent agencies to help them negotiate better
deals. 248 Freelancing and non-exclusive contracts became standard practices
for A-list stars, as long-term contracts ceased to be the norm. 249
Because they had so much talent in their stables, and their talent had
negotiating power due to their new creative freedoms, agents rose in importance. 250 Their rise leads to the next step in the through line between
Davis and de Havilland’s struggles and the recent labor dispute between
writers and agents: the ascendancy of Lew Wasserman. 251
While working as a movie theater usher in high school, Wasserman
developed his love for film. 252 In 1936, he was hired by the Music Corporation of America (“MCA”), a Chicago agency that controlled band-bookings. 253 Soon, MCA represented singers, comedians, and other performers. 254 At this time, MCA also expanded its agency operations to the film
246. See HOLLYWOOD AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 216 (“The De Havilland Law was
part of several larger film industry shifts that occurred in postwar Hollywood that helped to furnish
the free agency that largely remains in place for A-list screen talent today.”). The decline of filmgoing audiences due to the growing popularity of television also contributed to the end of the classical studio era. See Drea, supra note 23, at 114.
247. Belloni, supra note 225 (discussing how De Haviland “shift[ed] negotiation power
from studios to talent”).
248. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 206 (“[S]tars were able to choose their films, to order
script changes, and to keep a percentage of box-office revenues.”). While it is true that a number
of actors, writers, and directors chose to seek representation in an effort to gain better deals, many
of these artists needed representation to find employment due to the studio layoffs of talent and
craftsmen. See CASPER, supra note 16, at 46; Drea, supra note 23 at 114 (describing how studios
had to layoff talent in order to reduce payrolls).
249. See CASPER, supra note 16, at 47 (noting that the number of actors under contract with
the major studios steadily declined in the postwar era).
250. See GOMERY, supra note 1 at 205; CASPER, supra note 16, at 47; HOLLYWOOD AND
supra note 9, at 217.

THE LAW,

251. See generally GOMERY, supra note 1, at 202–10. Other important agents in the postwar era included Ray Stark, Phil Gersh, and Irving “Swifty” Lazar. See HOLLYWOOD AND THE
LAW, supra note 9, at 217.
252. GOMERY, supra note 1, at 204.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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business, and Wasserman was asked to move to Hollywood. 255 One of his
earliest signings was Bette Davis in 1940. 256 Davis and Wasserman were
kindred spirits in the fight against the seven-year contract system. 257 By
1950, Lew Wasserman had become one of the most powerful talent agents
in Hollywood with an impressive list of clients including actors, directors,
and writers. 258
Wasserman deployed two business strategies that would change the industry. 259 First, building on strategies agents occasionally used during the
classic studio era, 260 Wasserman made packaging a standard industry practice. 261 Packaging was a way for Wasserman to maximize his commissions
by filling a number of positions on a movie with his clients, such as with a
writer, a director, and a star. 262 Wasserman was able to package with regularity because he represented many of the biggest names in the industry, 263
and unlike the development process during the classic studio era that was
centered in the studios, the majority of feature films originated outside the
major studios often with one of these names attached. 264 Secondly, Wasserman created a production side to his agency. 265 After obtaining a blanket

255. Drea, supra note 23, at 114.
256. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 205.
257. Id. at 206.
258. Drea, supra note 23, at 114–15; GOMERY, supra note 1, at 205–06 (calling Wasserman
the “king of the agents”).
259. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 206 (identifying packaging as the end of the classic
studio era).
260. See TOM KEMPER, HIDDEN TALENT: THE EMERGENCE OF HOLLYWOOD AGENTS 198
(2010) (describing packaging deals in the classic studio era such as the package put together by
agent Charles Feldman for the film MODEL WIFE (Universal 1941)).
261. GOMERY, supra note 1, at 206.
262. Id. at 205–06.
263. Id. at 206; Drea, supra note 23, at 114.
264. See CASPER, supra note 16, at 48.
265. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 206; Drea, supra note 23, at 115. During the classic
studio era, agent Charles Feldman received a special waiver from the Screen Actors Guild to produce. See KEMPER, supra note 260. Feldman’s production company functioned like an extension
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waiver from the Screen Actors Guild, 266 MCA started producing television
shows in 1950 with its clients as stars. 267 The creation of a production company grew out of Wasserman’s desire to earn more than the standard agency
commission of ten percent, 268 and the reality that actors needed work after
the majors divested from their theaters. 269
In 2019, the WGA sought to eliminate packaging fees and to prohibit
agencies from owning production companies. 270 Since the 1950s, agencies
have moved away from the standard ten-percent commission model and
shifted to a packaging fee model which often includes profit-participation
for the agency. 271 Writers now complain that agents have prioritized their
interests in packaging fees over their obligations to their writer-clients. 272
The WGA also asserts that tying a packaging fee to a show’s profits provides
an incentive to reduce expenses, which include the amount paid to writers
and other talent. 273 As for the issue of agents acting as producers, the three
largest agencies each have an agency-affiliated production company. 274 The
of his agency and developed projects and package deals to be presented to the studios. See id. at
198.
266. See Drea, supra note 23, at 116; see generally KEMPER, supra note 260, at 132–37.
267. See Drea, supra note 23, at 115.
268. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 206 (documenting revenues that the agency earned if a
television series it produced went into syndication).
269. See id. (explaining that SAG gave MCA a blanket waiver to allow it to move into
production because “SAG members were happy for the work.”). See also supra notes 248–249
(describing how studio layoffs put many actors and craftsmen out of work).
270. See Agency Campaign Timeline, supra note 237.
271. See Answer and Counterclaims at 35, William Morris Endeavor Ent., LLC v. Writers
Guild, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 3d 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (No. 19-CV-05465); Drea, supra note 23, at
124 (explaining that “[w]hen television programs or motion pictures are successful enough to generate meaningful back-end profits, a talent agency can earn more from package fees than it would
under a traditional commission system.”).
272. William Morris Answer and Counterclaims, supra note 271, at 5.
273. See id.
274. See Dave McNary, WME Urges Writer Clients to ‘Speak Up’ and Push WGA for
‘Good Faith Negotiation’, VARIETY (Mar. 4, 2019, 11:58 AM), https://variety.com/2019/film/news
/wme-wga-good-faith-negotiation-1203154430/ [https://perma.cc/HL3D-EWKW].
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WGA objects to agency-affiliated production companies as a conflict of interest with writers’ agents also acting as their bosses. 275
The recently resolved conflict between the WGA and the talent agencies is thematically related to Davis and de Havilland’s legal battles because
it is another example of the enduring struggle by artists to ensure they are
treated fairly. The conflict can also be viewed as a consequence of the shift
in the balance of power to the agents caused by de Havilland’s victory to the
agents. 276 The WGA seeks to correct what it sees as an imbalance of power
in its relationship with the agencies as that imbalance has manifested itself
in the practices of packaging and agency-affiliated production. 277

VI. CONCLUSION
One of the foremost labor issues in the entertainment industry today—
the dispute between the WGA and the ATA—is directly linked to the innovations of agent Lew Wasserman. But Wasserman would not have had his
opportunity to lead agents to the apex of the film industry unless Olivia de
Havilland had fought and won her case. 278 Archival research shows that
Bette Davis’s challenge, although a battle she ultimately lost, foreshadowed
de Havilland’s victory. She cornered a major studio into waiving its rights
to suspension/extension, and new research shows she nearly compelled the
studio to revise its standard long-term contract. The practice of suspension/extension was an important component to the studio system, which gave
the studios a means of controlling their stars even past the termination date
275. See David Robb, WGA Says 75% Of Projects At Agency-Affiliated Production Companies Are Written By Agencies’ Own Clients, DEADLINE (May 15, 2019, 1:35 PM), https://deadline.com/2019/05/writers-guild-agency-affiliation-argument-hollywood-production-wga1202615758/ [https://perma.cc/TR33-VPR7] (reporting a discussion of members of the WGA negotiating committee about the conflict of interest that arises from having your fiduciary also be
your employer). See also Drea, supra note 23, at 120 (discussing the anti-trust case against MCA
which resulted in MCA dissolving its talent agency and operating solely as a production company).
276. See supra notes 245–52 and accompanying text.
277. As of February 5, 2021, the WGA reached a deal on a new franchise agreement with
all agencies that addressed the WGA’s concerns about packaging and agency-affiliated production
companies. See Erik Hayden & Kim Masters, WME, Writers Guild Agree to Terms as Hollywood’s
Bitter Feud Winds Down, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Feb. 5, 2021, 4:08 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/sources-wme-writers-guild-agree-to-terms-as-hollywoods-bitter-feudwinds-down/ [https://perma.cc/7VQP-Q42S].
278. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 306 (“Wasserman got his opportunity with the de Havilland case of 1945.”).
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of their contracts. The practice could ruin an actor’s career, and openly challenging the studios could do likewise. 279 It took the bravery of two women,
who wanted artistic freedom and equal pay, to end the practice with finality.

279. See supra notes 47 and 48.

